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The following remarks were made by Gerd Nonneman in connection with his 
participation in the conference entitled “Iran Under President Ahmadinejad,” which was 
held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars on June 26, 2006. The 
opinions expressed here are those of the speaker and in no way represent the views or 
opinions of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.  
 
Well thank you, Abbas Maleki, because my brief was fairly broad initially: “Iranian 
Foreign Policy: A European Perspective” of sorts. One of the key things I can now 
dispense with is [that] the range of Iranian foreign policy interests of course has changed 
and has broadened, and I can also dispense, to a large extent, with the economic drivers 
of interests. So I will say a few things about the drivers of Iranian foreign policy in 
general and then how it affects the nuclear question, and at the same time say a few 
things about the European angle. I can’t do more than give a few brief sketch-like points, 
and then hopefully we can pursue things in the discussion. Maybe let’s say something 
about the European bit first.  
 
Here is a European based in the UK giving a European view. I’m not claiming to 
represent European views generally, of which there are many and some more coherent 
than others. But any rate, for what it’s worth, I have actually done some work in the last 
few years specifically on European relations with the Middle East - “European” of course 
meaning both individual countries and the EU as such. Okay, a few basics. For starters, 
“Europe,” however defined, is different from the United States in terms of its location, 
vis-à-vis, Iran. It’s very much closer and that has an effect not just in any objective sense 
but also for the way in which Europeans generally perceive Iran.  Geographical proximity 
brings particular security concerns.  But this also already points to one danger of 
stereotyping European approaches: depending on where you are in Europe, your 
geographical position is going to be different, hence your interests and your perception of 
Iran is going to be different. Second, there are very direct economic interests, in terms of 
markets, in terms of gas supply because Europe, as you all know, is far more dependent 
on external energy supplies than is the U.S. Third point very briefly, the pattern of 
relations between Europe and Iran is quite distinct from that of the United States and Iran. 
The pattern has been one of engagement, by and large, punctuated by moments of crisis. 
At the moment, we’ve just gone through a bit of a crisis; but the pattern, I think, is that 
continuing engagement will dominate, which arguably is the opposite of what the U.S. 
relations with Iran have gone through. 
 
A few more points about Europe before we move onto Iran proper. The first is that it is 
many countries; there’s no one observation that can be made about Europe as such and 
you have different interests and different views. The second is that within each of these 
countries there are differences as well, which shouldn’t be a surprise if you look at the 
current debates going on within the U.S. about Iran policy. The third is that, again 
resembling what’s happening in the U.S., [there is] a lack of clear conclusive evidence 
and intelligence about what’s going on in Iran. The fourth is something about the EU as 
an institution because very often when people talk about Europe as a foreign policy actor, 
they are really talking about the EU, which is a mistake. The EU as an institution is one 
part of the European picture. The problem with the EU as a mechanism of foreign policy 
is that it is very weak. The EU is really two things: it’s the EC (European Community) 
that includes all the economic external relations. That’s very strong and very developed. 
[The] CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) is the other bit. And that remains 
very weak and divided. Even if it now has a High Representative for Foreign policy in 
Javier Solana, it suffers from these various interests not having been reconciled - and they 
won’t be any time soon, either. Now the Iran case is interesting because that’s where 
we’ve had an ad-hoc arrangement – the so-called “EU3” or the “E3/EU” because the 
negotiations between “Europe” and Iran over the nuclear file were not initially run by the 
EU at all. The fact is there were three countries, the “Big 3,” who decided amongst 
themselves that this would be a good idea: to break through the logjam [and] to break 
through the problems of CFSP. And it was then quickly garbed in an EU dress, to the 
persistent dissatisfaction of lots of other EU countries, it has to be said. But nevertheless, 
[the plan was] quite successful and it’s now diplomatically represented as E3/EU.  
 
There are two final points to be made about Europe and its relations with Iran. One is that 
the experience of the Iraq war has seriously affected the way this whole problem is 
currently being treated. There’s an additional layer of caution that’s built in. And the final 
one is of course the U.S. factor, which has been exacerbated by the Iraq experience. 
There is still an element of wariness of the U.S. in some parts of the European policy 
elite, and on the other hand of course there’s a contradictory trend of realization that one 
has to or one ought to go along with U.S. preferences. 
 
So let’s now turn to Iran as seen by, as I said, one European.  Even though I’ve indicated 
that there is no clear European policy and there are all sorts of problems with the EU as 
an active in foreign policy, etc, nevertheless, I think it is fair to say that at least in some 
parts of Europe perhaps there is a bit of a better handle on things Iranian than there has 
been in the U.S., and this is largely to do with the fact that Europeans have had better 
access to Iran since the Revolution (access which was only briefly interrupted at times). 
Secondly, since the 1990s and the 2000s, there was this critical dialogue and then there 
was the comprehensive dialogue which all made for a lot of contact [and] a lot of 
personal links being built up. Specifically, the negotiations of the nuclear file with the 
E3/EU again have fed into a sense that one has somewhat of a better handle of what’s 
going on in Iran. Even so, having said that, and having talked to some of the European 
commission officials who were directly involved with a lot of these negotiations, its fair 
to say, I think, that very often they were going into them like this [fingers crossed] or 
they were coming out of the negotiations like that, just hoping and praying that they were 
going to have a deal that was going to stick and never being too sure about the outcome.  
 
So what about the drivers of Iranian foreign policy including on nuclear issues? This is 
not going to be anything new for you so I can be very brief. First, Iran has a very, very 
long history. Now that has a dual impact: on the one hand, there’s a sense of pride and the 
fact and the perceived right of being an important regional power; on the other hand, of 
course, that long experience also includes a lot of experience of invasion, external 
intervention, etc. which has colored the foreign policy culture. Most specifically and 
more recently, it’s the Iran-Iraq war that’s affected and has colored perceptions. And it’s 
not just a question of perceptions in a vague sense; it’s very specific. The defensive 
capacity of Iran was severely diminished by that war. They saw the Iraqis using chemical 
weapons. Under the subsequent sanctions regime, on top of it all, Iran has found itself 
falling behind in terms of conventional weapons in a regional and global context in which 
they felt they needed them. Its regional neighborhood is not just one of economic 
opportunities; it is one of threats, and [in addition to] the problems hinted at by Abbas, 
fear of instability and Sunni radicalism emerging in the region in various ways. That 
uncertain threatening neighborhood (a little bit further afield of course you have Israel) 
explains some of the fears and some of the drivers of Iranian foreign and defense policy. 
If you combine that with this falling behind in conventional weapons, you can understand 
why they would be interested in acquiring and developing a surface-to-surface missile 
capability and perhaps a discussion about nuclear weapons capability. And the final 
determinant, I’d say, is the view that the US is seen as a genuine possible threat. Of 
course on top of all that, you have to add in what we were talking about in the first half of 
this meeting: that is, the multiple elements and multiple factions that shape foreign policy 
in Iran. Yes, foreign policy and security policy is largely determined by the Iranian NSC 
(National Security Council) but of course in that, these various factions are also (some of 
them anyway) represented and there is a gradual change of composition taking place in 
the National Security Council.  
 
All right, to what extent, then, are ideas involved? It is also in these factions, I suppose, 
that you can see some of the ideational legacies of the Revolution pulling through, but I 
would argue the largest ideational factor is nationalism. The worry that lots of people 
have had about Iran, especially in the U.S. but not just in the U.S., is that particularly 
since Ahmadinejad’s election, there has been this irrational element, (i.e. “Who is this 
guy?”). I remember a colleague, a very good scholar otherwise, simply saying the guy’s a 
“nutcase.” If you get that sort of language, of course its not surprising people get worried. 
Does Iranian foreign policy have an irrational and hence dangerous tinge to it, especially 
when you think about the nuclear file? My answer would be “no”, for a number of 
reasons.  
 
The first reason is that one of the bits of evidence often referred to on this is what 
Ahmadinejad said about Israel or about the Zionist entity or regime. There’s a lot of 
discussion possible about this but as far as I can read it, all he was doing in fact was 
quoting something that Khomeini had said. Clearly he sympathized with it, but it does not 
translate, at least in my estimation, to a view that Israel can be physically destroyed. We 
can discuss that. Secondly, his rhetoric ties in directly, I think, to what we were 
discussing before the break: that is, domestic politics and factionalism. And in particular, 
I think, he tries to build up not only his own support in the country at large, but to kind of 
gather around some of his generation that went through the Iran-Iraq War, that was in the 
Baseej, and that was in the Revolutionary Guards. [In other words] that broadly 
conservative kind of group that felt excluded, as we were discussing before the break, 
that’s now beginning to split. There are now these splits happening. One of their guys got 
to the Presidency and suddenly you see that there are now rivalries emerging, and I see a 
lot of this rhetoric not as indicating some kind of irrational dangerous nutcase but quite 
simply a populist building of support and trying to rally the troops. The third reason 
simply comes from what I’ve said before, that is to say, there are perfectly rational 
security fears that influence Iran’s foreign and security policies. And the fourth is that 
you could say that Khomeini, Khamenei and Ahmadinejad himself plus lots of others 
have actually said that the use of weapons of mass destruction in general is completely 
incompatible with Islamic values and with Iran’s values. Now there’s been debate about 
that – what exactly that means, whether it might mean that perhaps for defensive 
purposes if others have already done it might give you the right as well as a necessary 
evil. But it’s instructive, I think, to at least note that when Iran was under terrible 
pressures in the Iran-Iraq war, when Iraqis were using chemical weapons, Khomeini 
vetoed the full-scale “hitting back” in the same way or flattening Baghdad.  
 
What about the nuclear file more specifically? I think that there’s been a change in the 
Iran nuclear debate. In fact the Wilson center itself had a meeting here a couple years 
ago, I think, and there’s a very useful summary of the nuclear debate on that website. It 
shifted because it has become more public, particularly since the recent controversy with 
the EU and with the U.S. But the one thing that seems clear is that all the factions, not 
just different emerging factions within the conservative group, but across the spectrum 
(including reformists and most opponents of the regime) are united around two things: 
one, the right of nuclear power, and two, not to give in or to make policy under external 
pressure. That riles just about everyone both in society at large and amongst the various 
factions. Specifically on the nuclear weapons question, there’s a range of views, I’d say. 
Nobody’s one hundred percent sure; there’s no opinion polls that are reliable on this, and 
nobody knows for one hundred percent what the various individuals think in power. But 
I’d say there’s a big range of views amongst the relevant policy elites all the way from 
saying “No, no way should we have nuclear weapons, nor should we even think about it, 
both for ideological and for security reasons because its only going to hurt us more than 
anybody else” to on the other side [where] people who might be willing to consider it 
given Iran’s security predicament. In-between [there are] a variety of views including 
“well, perhaps we should put ourselves in a position where others might think we’d be 
able to go for it if the time came and thus we can use that as a bargaining chip, as a 
deterrent, and of course as a means to achieve prestige in the region and more widely.”  
 
What about the facts, then? Well as I’ve already suggested, very few people are sure of 
the facts. I think the one thing we know for sure, the one “known-unknown”, is that we 
don’t know. But there’s definitely no smoking gun, contrary to all the assertions that we 
have been hearing from certain parts of the U.S. administration. Iran is not demonstrably 
in substantial breach of the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty). Of course it might 
be, but we can’t be certain. The problem has been that there isn’t any trust, and the 
intended way of countering this lack of trust was the confidence-building measures 
demanded by the EU3, and the IAEA and agreed to by Iran,  some of which – the so-
called “transparency measures” – Iran then later stated it didn’t want to implement 
anymore. So if we know that there’s no smoking gun and that beyond that there is a lack 
of trust and we’re not absolutely sure what the various factions think, then what are the 
intentions?  
 
I’m going to have to be very brief. I’ll suggest just a few things. “Whose intentions?” is 
the first question. There are perhaps lots of different intentions among Iranian 
policymakers. We’ve already established that Ahmadinejad himself doesn’t really have a 
major grip on foreign policy. So that’s important, even though he has perhaps indirect 
influence. Secondly, the IRGC, the revolutionary guards, clearly have some hold and 
influence over the nuclear file. There have been recent statements by senior people from 
the revolutionary guards that they see themselves as having a role in foreign policy more 
generally, and of course they have a track record of actual involvement in regional 
activities that have occurred quite regardless of official government policy. But basically 
the upshot of it is, I think, that even if there are elements within the guards who think that 
under certain circumstances it might be defensible to go with the nuclear weapons option, 
I simply am not convinced that they either have the sufficient autonomy (room for 
maneuver) or that they’d be able to build up a sufficiently coherent coalition in favor of 
that particular strand of thought. That is, the strand of thought that says, “Yes, Iran should 
go for working and deployable nuclear weapons [and] to make that the dominant strand 
of policy preference in Iran.” That is not to say that there would not be a possible 
consensus around a policy that aims at having the potential to move to nuclear weapons 
capability – even without intention to take the final step – as under such a policy those 
who are against their use in any circumstances, those who think it could be a useful 
bargaining chip and/or lend prestige, and those who think it might be permissible in 
extreme situations of defense, could come together.  
 
What are the options in that case? This can be very brief. I think our options can be based 
on two observations: One, what are the drivers of Iranian policy that I just talked about 
and two, what does Iran want from the U.S.? Essentially I think Iran wants from the 
United States two things: recognition of its legitimate national security interests as it sees 
them and recognition of what it sees as its rightful place in the politics of the region. If 
those two things can be secured, then lots of things become possible. Consequently, I’d 
make the following point: isolation and threats and military intervention could only make 
things worse, firstly because it would influence the internal political shifts in the worst 
possible direction; secondly because it would probably enhance or speed up the pursuit of 
nuclear weapons; and thirdly because once you start getting into military action you then 
get backlash in the wider region. We can talk about the effectiveness of any military 
option in a more limited sense in discussion.  
 
If that is not a desirable policy, then what are the alternatives? Well, a combination of 
carrots and face-saving avenues for climb-down, I think, can work, because prestige and 
image counts for a lot. And that means that whatever is happening in the current 
initiatives, the one thing that can destroy those regardless of the details in the proposals 
would be a perception that the U.S. is still out for regime change. If that is constantly 
being reiterated in all sorts of ways, then you can forget about the more specific 
negotiations constructively going anywhere very quickly.  
 
To sum up, my guess is that Iran will not go fully nuclear in weapons terms, again 
contrary to what lots of people have been saying. It will want to get to a position, though, 
where they can credibly keep the possibility open and [nurture] people’s perceptions of 
the possibility that they might if they are pushed in a corner. The finding that Iran is 
about ten years away from nuclear weapons capabilities doesn’t really mean anything. 
What country with advanced civilian nuclear technology is not in that position? It’s all 
about intentions. So given the drivers that I have identified for Iran’s security policy, 
threats, saber-rattling, and slights are precisely what may turn the situation into a self-
fulfilling prophecy. Of course you could note that Iran’s policy itself has been rather 
good at creating self-fulfilling prophecies, too, but that doesn’t give Europeans or 
Americans an excuse to go down the same misguided route.  
 
 
